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Abstract
This study aimed to determine whether or not a correlation between independent
expenditure levels and political partisanship in the US House of Representatives exists, using the
Congressional sessions from before and after the Citizens United decision to determine if the
decision had any effect on political partisanship. Multiple factors were tested to determine levels
of correlation and to adjust for any potential exasperating factors. The study concluded that a
very strong correlation exists between aggregate levels of independent expenditures and distance
between average levels of partisanship for the parties. However, no causal relationship could be
established from the data alone, though the causal mechanism was hypothesized for further
research.
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Executive Summary
The Citizens United decision fundamentally changed how political campaigns are
financed in US politics. In the decision, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the 2003
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restriction of levels of independent expenditures,
expenditures made on a candidate’s behalf by outside organizations without coordinating directly
with the candidate, as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Furthermore, the Court held
that the significant increase in expenditures did not give rise to political corruption or the
appearance thereof. The case divides opinion sharply, as some view the decision as expansive of
free speech, while others view it as corruptive of the US political system as favors are implicitly
granted in exchange for independent expenditures placed for or against candidates. The case has
become a rallying cry for those who advocate for campaign finance reform and has been the
subject of discussion for many a political pundit. This project examined whether or not the
Citizens United decision, through its introduction of a massive flood of new independent
expenditure sources and through its providing of a legal framework for the independent
expenditure-only committee, also known as the super PAC, has increased the levels of political
partisanship in the US House of Representatives.
The literature surrounding the subject of partisanship centers on explaining the larger
trend of increasing partisanship, a trend that is essential to keep in mind when examining the
trends from before and after the Citizens United decision was handed down. Some sources claim
that the trend in partisanship is a continuation of the realignment that occurred after the Civil
Rights Era, some claim that gerrymandering causes partisanship in the House, while others
strongly refute the notion that gerrymandering causes any form of political partisanship. On the
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subject of independent expenditures leading to political partisanship through an implicit and
indirect quid-pro-quo coordination, however, no existing literature covered the topic.
To examine the trends and begin to establish the correlation, this study used independent
expenditure data collected both before and after the decision gathered from FEC filings and
displayed on OpenSecrets, a division of the Center for Responsive Politics. This study also
employed DW-NOMINATE scores to measure partisanship levels in the US House of
Representatives over the time examined. The independent expenditures were divided into proRepublican and pro-Democrat categories for each election cycle and then regressed alongside
average partisanship for the subsequent Congressional sessions. This study also examined the
total numer of independent expenditures per election cycle versus the distance between the
average partisanship scores per subsequent Congressional sessions. This study found that a very
strong correlation exists between levels of independent expenditures and levels of political
partisanship in the years before and after decision. However, a solid, definite causal mechanism
to this correlation could not be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. This study then examined
potential causal mechanisms as well as alternate theories that could possibly address the trend
found. This study then examines the implications of such a correlation and the Citizens United
decision, more specifically the potential for the appearance of corruption in light of recent
indictments having to do with quid-pro-quo corruption and independent expenditures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876] has been one of the most
controversial decisions handed down under the Roberts Court, and yet its practical implications
are usually merely the topic of speculation by political pundits, bloggers, and news media
outlets. President Barack Obama referred to the decision as "a major victory for big oil, Wall
Street banks, health insurance companies and other powerful interests that marshal their power
every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans” (Kang 3). The case
that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell praises while Senators Bernie Sanders and John
McCain decry clearly divides opinion on the implications of the decision on campaign finance.
But what effects has the decision had on the US political system? More specifically, in an
atmosphere of increasing political polarization, has Citizens United contributed to the
phenomenon?
I found that, in the US House of Representatives, the Citizens United decision likely did
have an effect on average partisan distance between the two major political parties. Through a
correlation between independent expenditure levels and average political partisanship for each
respective party, and then through a correlation between aggregate independent expenditure
levels and distance between average partisanship levels for the respective parties, in the years
following the Citizens United decision, partisanship increased alongside independent expenditure
increases. This particularly shows that the Citizens United decision is likely a factor in the
increase in partisanship and distance between the two parties experienced in the most recent
Congressional sessions. I first examined the exact text and implications of the decision. I then
aggregated both independent expenditure data and partisanship level scores. I regressed the data,
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identifying the correlation from multiple angles. I then concluded that the Citizens United
decision is one of multiple factors that have fueled the increase in partisanship in the US House
of Representatives in recent years.
This question is extremely relevant to the current political sphere. Citizens United marks
both a departure from precedent and a significant change in how campaign finance functions.
The effects of this change, however, have not been extensively documented by academics and
often get lost in the rhetoric and accusations made by politicians on the topic. I believe that this
may be the case in the House of Representatives for new candidates with relatively obscure
political position records, especially if the importance of campaign finance campaign finance
outweighs the need to resonate with a median voter in order to undermine an incumbent
representative. Furthermore, the sheer amounts of money independent expenditure-only
committees have been able to raise and spend for and against candidates makes the topic a
significant question of interest. In the 2014 election alone, independent expenditure-only
committees raised $606,116,702 in independent expenditure funds and spent $345,632,140 of the
funds for or against particular candidates (“Outside Spending, By Super PAC”). Even though
these independent expenditure-only committees are not legally allowed to coordinate with
candidates, single-candidate independent expenditure-only committees have become important
players in the campaign finance of particular candidates. This allows corporations, unions, and
individuals to give unlimited amounts in support of particular candidates without violating
election law, since these particular committees are “independent” of the candidate.
Methodology
I first discuss the specifics of how the Citizens United decision changed the electoral
process, what it legalized, and what has arisen in the wake of the decision, specifically the super
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PAC. This is integral to understanding how independent expenditures work in the wake of
Citizens United. I then examine trends in independent expenditures from the pre-decision and
post-decision House election cycles. I then show how independent expenditures have
significantly increased in the wake of the Citizens United decision. I then examine the trends in
partisanship that coincide with the Citizens United decision. Using the data I have collected, I am
able to analyze partisanship levels in relation to independent expenditure levels. I examine the
correlation between average independent expenditure amounts and average partisanship level,
determined by DW-NOMINATE score, on a party level. I then use average aggregate
independent expenditure levels compared to distance between average DW-NOMINATE scores
to compare how independent expenditures have affected the distance between the party’s average
partisanship levels. I then discuss the merits and limits of the alternate theories that have been
proposed on the topics I have researched.
I utilize online databases such as OpenSecrets, FEC disclosures, studies and publications
by the Sunlight Foundation, and other sources to gather the data necessary for testing this
hypothesis. I use these databases in this case to determine which candidates have received
increasingly larger amounts of independent expenditures. I also use the database to track the
organizations where these independent expenditures are originating from in order to determine
the ideological intentions behind the independent expenditure. I determine ideological stance
behind organizations based on their stated intentions, organizational platform, important issues,
and past donation and expenditure tendencies. I use this data to display how amounts of
independent expenditures, their sources, and their beneficiaries have changed since Citizens
United and to contrast post-Citizens United expenditures with ones that occurred before the
decision, when independent expenditures were significantly more limited.
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I use databases such as GovTrack and VoteView in order to determine levels of
partisanship and to measure how these scores have changed over time with respect to
independent expenditures. These databases allow me to gauge how degree of ideological
extremism over time has changed and allow me to graph the change alongside increases in
independent expenditures. I employ the R program for the statistical analysis portion of the
project. I use the program to produce the correlation coefficients and to aggregate and analyze
the data that I mine out of the aforementioned resources. I also use the program to produce
visuals and graphs to display the data in order to facilitate analysis.
The Decision
The decision of the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
from hereon out noted as Citizens United, profoundly affected how federal elections are and can
be financed and provided a new source of potential electoral funds for candidates. Before
Citizens United, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), passed in 2002, prohibited “the
broadcast, cable or satellite transmission of ‘electioneering communications’ paid for by
corporations or labor unions from their general funds in the 30 days before a presidential primary
and in the 60 days before a general election” (Liptak). Citizens United, a non-profit organization
that describes itself as seeking “to reassert the traditional American values of limited
government, freedom of enterprise, strong families, and national sovereignty and security,”
sought to screen a political documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie during the 2008 presidential
election cycle within the prohibited margins set out by the BCRA (“Who Are We”, Liptak).
While Citizens United contended that the movie was “issue speech” and therefore did “not
expressly say how a voter should vote,” the US District Court for the District of Columbia found
that the movie “references the election and Senator Clinton’s candidacy, and it takes a position
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on her character, qualifications, and fitness for office (Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, US District Court for the District of Columbia). On these grounds, the US District
Court enforced precedent set down in both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and denied Citizens United the right to both
advertise and air the film. The case was then appealed for certiorari to the Supreme Court and
was placed on the docket for early 2009.
The Supreme Court took a broad and expansive scope in deciding the case. In the
decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court “recognized that First Amendment protection
extends to corporations” and that “‘as a restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign,’” the BCRA “prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S.
Ct. 876] p. 22-25). In essence, while “corporations or unions may not give money directly to
campaigns, they may seek to persuade the voting public through other means, including
[advertisements]” (“Case Files: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission”). This, in
essence, is the definition of the term independent expenditure. The decision allows corporations,
unions, or other similar organizations to spend money from their general treasuries on political
speech for or against candidates in unlimited amounts and without time restrictions as long as the
organizations do not directly coordinate with the candidate they are supporting. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that any “anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here
in question” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876] p. 22-25). Justice Kennedy
established that the BCRA seeks to limit First Amendment rights in the interest of “the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” (idem. at 29). When examining cases
involving restrictions on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court uses the “strict scrutiny” test,
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which “requires the Government to prove that that the restriction [in question] ‘furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest’” (idem. at 23). The Court’s
majority found that, in this case, the provisions of the BCRA banning “corporate independent
expenditures” cited Buckley v. Valeo in finding that expenditure bans outside of the realm of
direct contributions are “inadequate to justify” the restriction on First Amendment rights that the
ban imposes (idem. at 40). In essence, the Court held that anticorruption in the “quid-pro-quo”
sense, as Justice Stevens conceptualized, is not compelling enough of a governmental interest to
warrant a restriction on free speech in the form of spending money (idem.). This decision
legitimized a resource in campaign finance that, in comparison to today, was largely
underutilized and relatively unimportant. Perhaps the most important implication of Citizens
United was the inception of the super PAC.
The independent expenditure-only committee, commonly known as the “super PAC,” is a
political action committee that “may raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions,
associations, and individuals” and “spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against
political candidates” (“PACs: SuperPACs”). The super PAC entity was authorized in a US Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held in Speechnow.org v. Federal Election
Commission that, in the wake of the Citizens United decision and the holding that the
“government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures,”
“contributions to groups that only make independent expenditures cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.” It further held that any contribution limits on such organizations
“violate the First Amendment by preventing [individuals] from donating to [such organizations]
in excess of the limits and prohibiting [such organizations] from accepting donations in excess of
the limits” (“Ongoing Litigation: Speechnow.org v. FEC). This holding by the US Court of
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Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the legal status of the independent expenditureonly committee, providing a new and increasingly important entity for politicians to employ
while financing and administrating their campaigns. While the independent expenditure-only
committee’s legal existence was affirmed in Speechnow.org v. FEC, the legal basis for its
existence can be found within the Citizens United decision, and the Citizens United decision is
cited throughout the case. The Supreme Court denied the FEC’s petition for a writ of certiorari
in the Speechnow case on November 1st, 2010 and currently remains off of the Supreme Court’s
docket (“Speechnow.org v FEC”). This can be attributed as either an affirmation of the DC
Circuit Court’s ruling in the case or as merely a refusal to address the issue at the moment. Due
to the denial of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the DC Circuit Court’s holding remains the
acting precedent, and independent expenditure-only committees continue to legally operate in the
United States. As mentioned previously, the super PAC has evolved since 2010 to include singlecandidate independent expenditure-only committees that are allowed to make unlimited
expenditures for a particular candidate while maintaining legal independence from the particular
candidate.
Though the super PAC is perhaps the most visible and significant effect of the Citizens
United decision, the decision impacts campaign finance in other areas and expands the abilities
of other organizations, such as unions, corporations, and nonprofit operations to independently
expend on behalf of particular candidates, parties, or issues. Although super PACs have outspent
both unions and corporations by about a 7:2 margin in both the 2012 and the 2014 election cycle,
the Citizens United case specifically targeted the prohibitions in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act that “restricted corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to
make independent expenditures” (“Outside Spending,” Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310,
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130 S. Ct. 876] p. 1). Also, some 501(c) nonprofit organizations have contributed independent
expenditures for or against candidates even though the IRS forbids their primary involvement
being politics.
Literature Review
I have examined previous scholarship on the topic of the rise of partisanship in the
contemporary political atmosphere and on the topic of Citizens United, yet there seems to be a
missing connection between the two topics. Jens Grosser and Thomas R. Palfrey, Professors at
Florida State University and California Institute of Technology respectively, have produced what
they refer to as the “antimedian voter theorem” in order to address increasing partisanship among
political candidates. Grosser and Palfrey have found that “in large elections, only the most
extreme citizens will compete for office,” that “the result does not depend on the distribution of
voter preferences,” and that “political polarization is an equilibrium outcome even if the citizenry
is informed about candidates’ political leanings.” The theory addresses the “entry games” of
political candidates, concluding that strong partisans are the most likely to run for office (Grosser
and Palfrey). While this theory addresses what type of person is most likely to run for office, it
does not explain why partisanship would continuously increase nor increase sharply over the
period since Citizens United, which, according to the DW-NOMINATE data available on
VoteView, has been the case (“The Polarization of the Congressional Parties”).

Sanford

Levinson, constitutional law professor at University of Texas at Austin, seems to believe that
partisan gerrymandering contributes significantly to the recent spike in partisanship. Professor
Levinson believes that the “most fundamental consequence of the 2010 elections may have been
the opportunity they gave to Republican state legislatures…to redraw the political districts that
would elect representatives to Congress.” This has made “the distribution of voters more
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consequential than their raw number” and “render[s] general elections near-irrelevant” due to the
fact that districts are drawn to favor particular parties (Levinson).
While gerrymandering is commonly pointed to as a significant factor in increasing
partisan sentiments in the US House of Representatives, some political scientists have examined
the issue and ruled out gerrymandering as a potential cause of partisanship. Coincidentally, the
redrawing of congressional district lines took place in the same year that the Citizens United
decision was handed down. Naturally, one may conclude that gerrymandering provides more
secure seats for the incumbent party, allowing for the incumbent candidate to take on
increasingly more partisan political stances without having to risk moderating himself or herself
to appeal to a mixed district electorate. However, multiple scholars have already established that
gerrymandering effects neither political polarization nor electoral competition. Indeed, McCarty
et al. stated that “partisanship would appear to make a compelling circumstantial case for an
increase in polarization,” as “politicians are observed engaging in raw power politics” while
“simultaneously, electoral competitiveness declines in Congress.” However, they have found that
the “increase in polarization is not primarily a phenomenon of how voters are sorted into
districts” (McCarty et al.) Masket et. al, using the same DW-NOMINATE scores employed in
my own research, compared the use of partisan redistricting commissions versus nonpartisan
districting commissions in the wake of the 2000 census and subsequent redistricting. They
concluded that, “partisan redistricting schemes are, if anything, associated with declining
legislative polarization” (Masket et al.) Furthermore, as shown in the graphic below, the increase
in political partisanship is not exclusive to the House of Representatives, but also affects the
Senate (“The Polarization of the Congressional Parties”). If gerrymandering is the predominant
cause of the increase in political partisanship in the US Congress, one would expect to only see
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an increase in partisanship in the House, as the Senate cannot be gerrymandered due to its
design. While gerrymandering’s impact of partisanship is subject to debate, the gerrymandering
debate still ignores the potential impact that the introduction of vast quantities of independent
expenditures into the post-Citizens United election cycles has had on the significant increase in
partisanship across the political spectrum, but particularly in the US House of Representatives.
Senator Tom Udall, in a policy essay in the Yale Law and Policy Review, discussed the

jurisprudence and the implications of the Citizens United decision on those who run and serve in
Congress as well as a few ways that the decision could be overturned. Senator Udall asserts that
“our elections no longer focus on the needs and interests of individual voters, but are instead
shaped by multi-million dollar ad campaigns funded by special interest groups with seemingly
limitless resources” (Udall 2). Senator Udall also discusses what he has referred to as the
“endless campaign cycle,” where, due to the increase in campaign costs, “officials spend to much
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far too much time engaged in fundraising rather than doing the work the American people elect
them to do.” He quotes a joint op-ed published by “former US Senators Warren Rudman (R-NH)
and Tim Wirth (D-CO),” who assert that “Congress is stuck in the mud of strident partisanship,
excessive ideology, never-ending campaigns, and–at the heart of it all–a corrosive system of
private campaign funding.” Furthermore, both senators assert that “if there’s one reason for
leaving” the Senate that both candidates held in common, “it’s money” (idem. at 6). Senator
Udall goes on to advocate that since “Congress can no longer constitutionally protect the
integrity of the electoral process” due to decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United
v. FEC, “comprehensive reform can only be passed if there is a constitutional amendment that
provides Congress with the authority to regulate all aspects of the campaign finance system”
(idem. at 8). The senators addressed in the essay have experience working within campaign
finance legal structures both predating and postdating the Citizens United decision. All senators
feel that both the need to incessantly campaign and ensure both donations and independent
expenditures for oneself has been detrimental to the functioning of Congress. Furthermore,
Senators Rudman and Wirth seem to believe that private campaign finance, which includes
independent expenditures, is “at the heart of” the “strident partisanship” evident in both houses
of Congress (idem. at 6). However, none of the three Senators have examined the data on this
notion of increased partisanship resulting from changes in campaign finance laws in the wake of
Citizens United. While undoubtedly all three Senators have experienced in their work what they
feel to be increasing partisanship and what they feel to be increased pressure to align with special
interests, these are merely feelings. I seek to further this notion by examining the data on this
topic and establishing the correlation between Citizens United and the increase in partisanship in
Congress.
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Professor Richard Pildes, in the California Law Review, addresses the trend of increasing
polarization and provides both short-term and long-term explanations of the trend. Pildes first
shows how the “parties have become purer distillations of themselves” over time, explaining that
in “1976, moderates constituted 30% of the House [of Representatives],” while in 2002, “This
proportion had shrunk to 8%” (Pildes 277). Pildes then examines how “both parties tend to
marginalize their more moderate factions” and the “individual personalit[ies]” of those elected to
office, but ultimately concludes that explanations that solely implicate the personalities of those
in office as the cause of polarization are “implausible” and that “forces larger than the
personalities of particular political figures might well be at work” (281-287).
Pildes explains that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 “reflected and unleashed forces that,
building on themselves over several decades, have caused a tectonic shift in the underlying
foundations of American politics.” This shift, according to Pildes, “is perhaps the major cause of
the hyperpolarized partisan politics we now have” (287). He explains that the “Democratic
Party’s complete monopoly on the South” in the years predating the Voting Rights Act was not
the “product of routine forces of political competition,” but instead the product of “a sequence of
purposeful actions taken at the end of Reconstruction, which included violence, intimidation,
informal manipulation, and fraud.” These changes had the effect of “drastically reduc[ing]
African American electoral participation” and “destroying the foundation for any politically
effective challenge to the Party’s domination” (Pildes 288). This changed the dynamic of both
political parties. The “Democratic Party was a coalition of Southern Democrats [who were]
extremely conservative on race” and “moderate to liberal Democrats from other parts of the
country.” The Republican Party, on the other hand, consisted of “its own divided coalition of
liberals and moderates, mostly from the Northeast and West Coast, and much more traditional,

13
old-line conservatives from the Midwest and other rural areas.” Since “none of these groups
were large enough to pass legislation on their own…any significant legislation required
compromise and bargaining across party lines” (idem. at 289).
According to Pildes, the Voting Rights Act “initiated the rise of a genuine political
system in the South,” which in turn “reshaped the essential structure of the national political
parties.” Since the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court opinions stemming from it ruled
“literacy tests, poll taxes, manipulative registration practices, and durational residency
requirements” unconstitutional, “a massive infusion of new voters,” who were on average “much
more liberal than the median voting white Southerner had been before 1965,” inundated the
Southern electorate, causing an electoral shift. Conservatives found themselves more aligned
with the Republican Party, which became “highly conservative” while a “new, moderate-toliberal Democratic Party that was more in line with the rest of the Democratic Party” was left in
the wake. Due to a “self-reinforcing feedback dynamic,” the Democratic Party “became more
liberal in the South, conservatives fled,” and the Democratic Party became increasingly more
liberal while the “progressive strands on racial issues that had existed in the Republican Party
diminished” (idem. at 290). The full effect of this shift “took about thirty years to come to
fruitation,” but set off a process of “party purification” that the United States is “probably still in
the midst of” today (idem. at 293-294). Pildes’ analysis of the Voting Rights Act provides an
excellent explanation of the long-term trend of increasing polarization in American politics since
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. However, while Pildes explains a larger driving force of
the trend, he does not consider that the “party purification” he speaks of has increased
exponentially rather than at a steady rate, as shown in the table below. Furthermore, in the period
between the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the Reagan Presidency in 1980, the
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period in which this supposed party purification began to polarize the parties, partisanship
significantly decreased for significant amounts of time, with sharp upticks in some areas. Finally,
Pildes does not address the looming issue of whether or not independent expenditures, which
have significantly increased in amounts alongside the recent increase in polarization, contribute
to or exacerbate this trend. While Pildes’ argument that the Voting Rights Act influenced the
long-term increase in partisanship, he does not address the independent expenditure issue in
relation to the short-term increase in polarization we are experiencing today.
Data Disclaimer
Due to the nature of FEC filing and reporting requirements, the data available for each
candidate contains a margin of error. For example, considering items such as electioneering
communications, “several candidates can be listed on a report with no indication of how the
money should be distributed among the candidates, or even if the money is being spent for or
against candidates” (“Why Don’t These Numbers Add Up?”).

1

However, electioneering

communications constitute a rather small amount in proportion to the entirety of independent
expenditures. For example, in the 2012 election cycle, electioneering communications
constituted $15.4 million of the $1.37 billion spent in total independent expenditures (“Outside
Spending”). Clearly a margin of error exists within the data, and that standard error is displayed
on the graphs exhibited in the analysis portion below.
Furthermore, the data used in this project is the most recent data available through FEC
filings. However, through my experience with this data, as new FEC reports are filed, older
1

According to the FEC, “an electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable or satellite
communication that fulfills each of the following conditions: 1) The communication refers to a
clearly identified candidate for federal office; 2) the communication is publicly distributed
shortly before an election for the office that the candidate is seeking; and 3) the communication
is targeted to the relevant electorate (US House and Senate candidates only)” (Electioneering
Communications”).
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reports are uncovered, and different organizations are required to disclose, the data on particular
election years is subject to change. During the course of the research for this project, the
independent expenditure totals reported by OpenSecrets increased from the $998 million mark to
above $1 billion (idem.). OpenSecrets updates its data as it receives the reports from the FEC.
Though the data contained on the OpenSecrets website is somewhat subject to change, it is the
most accurate data available on independent expenditures available.
The data provided through the OpenSecrets and available in FEC filings only includes
any candidate with over $1000 in outside spending (“2014 Outside Spending, By Candidate,” see
bottom of page). This is not ideal, as I would like to get as comprehensive of a picture of the
actual amount of independent expenditures being made as possible. However, even when
multiple candidates have received less than $1000 in independent expenditures, the aggregate
effect of including these expenditures if the data was available would likely be negligible on the
outcome.
Analysis
Using OpenSecrets as my data reference, I crossed the aggregate independent expenditure
levels of the pre-Citizens United election cycles with the post-Citizens United election cycles,
one of which is currently ongoing. I have found that, in the wake of the Citizens United decision,
independent expenditures have increased from $143.6 million in 2008 to $205.5 million in 2010,
over $1billion in 2012, and $572.9 million in the ongoing 2014 election thus far (“Outside
Spending”). This shows a significant increase in the overall levels of independent expenditures in
federal elections, and the decrease in the 2014 column from the 2012 column can be explained
by recognizing that the election cycle is both not over and is not a year where a presidential
election occurs.
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Examining exclusively the US House of Representatives, independent expenditure
amounts from 2004-2014 follow a different trend from the overall rising amounts of independent
expenditures in elections. As shown in the graph below, total independent expenditures in US
House of Representative elections rose from 2004 election cycle to the 2006 election cycle and
then dropped from 2006 election cycle to the 2008 election cycle. Considering that the 2010
election cycle was the first election cycle to apply the Citizens United decision to campaign
finance, one might anticipate a significant increase in independent expenditures, as is reflected in
the graph. In the immediate wake of the Citizens United decision, independent expenditures in
US House of Representative elections rose from $66,553536 in the 2008 election cycle to
$253,918,012 in the 2010 election cycle and peaked at this number. It is also important to note
that 2010 was not a presidential election year. The trend of increased independent expenditures
in US House of Representative races in non-presidential election years is reflective of previous
occurrences, as displayed in the chart. This trend is further reflected in the next election cycle, as
from the 2010 election cycle to the 2012 election cycle, independent expenditures in House races
decreased from $250,918,012 in the 2010 cycle to $173,668,799 in the 2012 cycle. However,
interestingly, the trend of total independent expenditures continued downward in the next
election cycle, dropping from $173,668,799 in the 2012 cycle to $152,655,009 in the 2014 cycle
(OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics). While this amount is certainly significantly more
than the amount of independent expenditures being spent before the Citizens United decision, the
data counters the popular notion that, at least in the case of the House of Representatives, more
and more independent expenditures are being made on behalf of candidates. The expenditures
seem to have peaked in the election cycle following the decision and have significantly
decreased in the subsequent two election cycles.
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Breaking down the total independent expenditures into pro-Democrat and pro GOP
sections, a further interesting insight is made into independent expenditures made on behalf of
House candidates. The pro-democrat section of the graph below is comprised of both
expenditures identified by the Center for Responsive Politics and the expenditure’s FEC filings
as pro-democrat or against-GOP expenditures, while the pro-GOP section is comprised of
expenditures identified as either pro-GOP or against-Democrats (“Outside Spending, By
Candidate”). When broken down, the data trend reveals, interestingly, that in the 2010 election
cycle in the wake of Citizens United, contrary to popular belief, more independent expenditures
were made on behalf of Democrats than were made on behalf of Republicans, with Democrats
receiving the highest amount in the data range. In the subsequent 2012-election cycle, however,
Republicans outspent Democrats by almost $35 million, with Democrats receiving significantly
less independent expenditures and Republicans receiving the most of the data range. In the 2014
election cycle, the Democrats received slightly more than in the 2014 election cycle, while the
Republicans received significantly less, with both parties receiving within $11 million of each
other, the closest amount since the pre-Citizens United era.
Furthermore, according to the DW-NOMINATE dimensions exhibited on VoteView, the
distance between the parties’ first dimension, while part of a steady trend of increasing distance,
has risen quite sharply in the years since Citizens United was decided (“The Polarization of the
Congressional Parties”). The two graphs below display the breakdown in average partisanship,
based on DW-NOMINATE scores, of the Democratic and Republican parties from the 108th
Congress to the 113th Congress. A chart associating the Congressional session with the election
cycle year is provided above. While partisanship is increasing across both of the parties, as
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displayed previously, breaking down the two parties reveals some interesting trends about the
dynamics of partisanship in the US House of Representatives.
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The trend in GOP partisanship seems to be steadily increasing over the period of time examined.
While the average GOP DW-NOMINATE score is further from the center than the average
Democratic DW-NOMINATE score, the data trend does not exhibit any spikes or significant
outliers over the period of time examined. Outwardly, it does not exhibit any interesting
phenomenon that allows for inferences to be drawn from it.
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Significantly more interesting, however, is the trend exhibited within the Democratic
Party with respect to partisanship. The average Democratic score begins and ends at lower levels
than the average Republican score. However, the average Democratic Party score does not
follow the same steady, uninterrupted trend that the Republican Party’s data set exhibits. At first,
the Democratic Party’s trend begins to modestly rise between the 108th and 109th Congressional
sessions. Between the 109th and 111th sessions, however, the average DW-NOMINATE
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partisanship rating drops drastically, from -0.382 to -0.349. However, following the 2010
election cycle in the 112th Congress, the Democratic Party’s average partisanship score spiked
drastically, from -0.349 to an all-time high of -0.394. The average score then began a downward
slope, with the 113th Congress ultimately earning a score of -0.372. The Democratic Party’s
average DW-NOMINATE partisanship score does not follow the same gradual trend that the
GOP’s score does. Instead, the score spikes at a significant point in the data range.
The correlation coefficients of the data examined reveal that, over the years examined, a
correlation of varying strength exists between amount spent in independent expenditures on
campaigns and level of partisanship the US House of Representatives. The data is displayed on
the tables below. The correlation coefficient is defined as a number between 1 and -1, where 1
indicates a perfect positive correlation between the two values, 0 indicates no correlation, and -1
indicates a perfect negative correlation between the values. A weak correlation is defined as the
correlation coefficient being in the range of 0.1-0.3, with a medium strength correlation defined
as being in the range of 0.3-0.5 and a strong correlation being in the range of 0.5-1.0 (“Pearson
Product-Moment Correlation”). However, since the DW-NOMINATE score for Democrats is a
negative number, the more negative the correlation coefficient for Democrats, the stronger the
correlation. Examining the correlation coefficients after regressing aggregate pro-party spending
compared to average DW-NOMINATE score, I find that there is a strong correlation between
aggregate pro-party spending and partisanship, as denoted by DW-NOMINATE score. This
trend is displayed on the graphs on pages 24-27.
Examining the correlation in current dollars, I find that the correlation coefficient for
aggregate pro-GOP independent expenditures per election cycle versus average GOP DWNOMINATE score is 0.8670694, indicating a “very strong” correlation between the two
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variables. Likewise, when examining the same variables but substituting pro-Democrat
expenditures, the resulting correlation coefficient is -0.6048525, indicating a “strong” correlation
between the two variables. The graphs of these relationships can be found on pages 25-28.
Examining the correlation coefficients in constant dollars, I find that though controlling for
inflation has a nominal mitigating effect on the correlation between independent expenditures
and partisanship in the House, the “strong” correlation between the two variables still exists.
Under the same variable definitions as used above, but using constant dollars for the independent
expenditure levels, I found that the correlation coefficient for pro-GOP independent expenditures
in constant dollars versus average DW-NOMINATE score is 0.8264963, indicating that a “very
strong” correlation between the two variables still exists when controlling for inflation. Likewise,
when controlling for inflation, the correlation coefficient for the Democratic party is -0.6192044,
suggesting still that a strong correlation exists between average pro-Democrat independent
expenditures in House races and average partisanship in Congress. The graphs of these
relationships can be found on pages 29-32. Furthermore, the data for both parties remain within
the standard error for both statistical analyses, so no significant outliers are present. In order to
better analyze and visualize the data, I have included the graphs on the next two pages, which
display the trends above.
Perhaps the most significant relationship to analyze is the relationship between average
level of overall independent expenditure and average distance between DW-NOMINATE scores.
The average distance between the scores shows us how far apart the parties are from each other
at any given time. The graph of this relationship is displayed on p ages 33-34. The pre-Citizens
United election cycles (2004, 2006, and 2010) are all located towards the bottom of the graph
with little variance in average DW-NOMINATE distance when manipulating independent
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expenditure levels. However, the two election cycles (2010, 2012) that occurred after the
decision experienced both a significant increase in total expenditures and a significant increase in
distance between average DW-NOMINATE score. This suggests that there is a correlation
between total independent expenditure levels and average DW-NOMINATE score distance,
indicating that independent expenditure amounts are correlated with increased partisanship in the
US House of Representatives. Indeed, upon analysis of the data, the correlation coefficient for
the respective variables is 0.8335487, indicating that there is a very strong correlation between
total independent expenditure levels in an election cycle and the distance between party average
DW-NOMINATE scores in the subsequent House session. This relationship is perhaps the most
interesting. The above graph clearly shows the significant difference in the pre-Citizens United
era and the post-Citizens United era in terms of independent expenditures and political
partisanship. As more and more independent expenditures are made, the parties seem to be
moving further and further apart on political issues. This seems to be particularly true for the
House sessions immediately before and immediately after the Citizens United, as the most
significant increase in both independent expenditure levels and distance between average party
DW- NOMINATE score occurred in this span of time. This shows that the handing down of the
Citizens United decision is in fact correlated with the increase in partisanship levels in the US
House of Representatives.
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I posit that the Citizens United decision allowed significantly more independent
expenditure money into the campaign finance system while simultaneously creating aggregating
organizations in the form of super PACs. These super PACs tend to have significantly more
partisan views than the electorate or the average politician, and those super PACs who tend to
elicit the most donations tend to be the most partisan. The introduction of a new influx of
independent expenditures and the rise of the super PAC means that those in Congress who
appeal to the most powerful super PACs have an advantage in elections, as they will have more
independent expenditures in their favor than their opponents who do not win the favor of the
more powerful super PACs. Due to this need to win the favor of the most powerful super PACs,
Congressional candidates must adjust their viewpoints to be more in line with the more powerful
super PACs, which in turn causes a partisan shift in the Congressional electorate. This is further
solidified by the looming threat that, if those in Congress solicit the assistance of particular super
PACs during their election and do not espouse that particular super PAC’s platform while in
Congress, the solicited super PACs will then fund said member of Congress’s opponent in the
next primary. This makes each member of Congress beholden to the interests of the super PACs,
and therefore increases partisanship across the board. While this may be a plausible causal
mechanism, however, it may be incorrect or flawed.
While this correlation is very strong, and the causal mechanism I posit could possibly be
true, it does not necessarily indicate that the Citizens United decision caused the increase of
partisanship during this period, though it quite possibly could have contributed to it.
Unfortunately, without direct evidence indicating causation, which is extremely difficult to
manifest, it is impossible to conclude beyond a doubt that the Citizens United decision caused the
increase in political partisanship during the period studied, particularly when this increase in
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partisanship is also part of a longer trend of ever-increasing partisanship as previously described.
However, this is still an interesting correlation to examine. Further research could give more
insight into how the Citizens United decision has affected individual candidates. This could
consist of case studies of individual members of Congress tracking their independent expenditure
intakes, partisanship levels, and viewpoints on particular issues with respect to the viewpoints of
those individuals or organizations that make independent expenditures on behalf of the member
of Congress. This would allow insight into how particular members of Congress are affected by
independent expenditures while controlling for other variables. A longer-term study into the
effects of the Citizens United decision would also benefit the development of this thesis. The
decision has only been in effect for five years at the time of this study, and the data pool is
significantly restricted due to this fact. If Citizens United remains precedent for a significant
period of time following this project, a longer-term study of its effects would assist in
understanding the decision’s effect on political partisanship and determining if this increase is a
significant anomaly or just part of the greater overall trend of increasing partisanship.
Alternate Theories
The change in levels of partisanship in the US House of Representatives since the
Citizens United decision is probably not exclusively caused by the decision, and the correlation
between independent expenditure levels and partisanship in the US House of Representatives
could be explained by some other factors. In the literature review, I referenced Professor Richard
Pildes’ theory of increasing partisanship as a trend caused by the realignment of the two main
political parties during and after the Civil Rights Era. Certainly after examining the overall trend
of partisanship levels in the US, the current trend began its climb in the early-to-mid 1970s in the
wake of the realignment. Pildes provides a fair argument and perhaps there is some merit to his
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explanation of the trend, but while his explanation can explain the beginnings, he ignores a
multitude of other factors that, in the years since the political realignment, could have influenced
and furthered the trend of exponentially increasing political partisanship.
Implications
The correlation between independent expenditure levels and political partisanship
in the US House of Representatives reflect the real implications of the Citizens United decision
on the legislative process in the United States and on the democratic process as a whole. Through
unlimited independent expenditures and the introduction of the super PAC, groups and
individuals with specific special interests are able to directly or indirectly influence how
politicians vote on particular issues. Particularly in the House of Representatives, interest groups
are able to easily sway how politicians vote on particular issues, for the money that they expend
on the behalf or in opposition to particular candidates has the potential to decide both primaries
and general elections for or against candidates. Furthermore, former representatives such as
former Congressman Michael Arcuri have openly stated that they feel inclined to vote in line
with those who expend on behalf of their campaigns, for, as Arcuri put it, “those who have the
money need the favors done” (Arcuri). Though the Supreme Court declares that such
expenditures do not cause “corruption or the appearance of corruption” in a quidpro-quo sense, the notion that those with significant amounts of money to expend on behalf of
particular candidates can create at least the appearance of some form of corruption. The effect
that the increase of independent expenditures in the post-Citizens United era has had on political
partisanship in the US House of Representatives gives credence to this notion. If independent
expenditures can incline elected officials to hold increasingly more extreme views, seek less
compromise, and align themselves more with those who possess the means to make independent
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expenditures rather than all of those whom they represent, how can Congress still call itself a
democratic legislature?
Indeed, many still view the lifting of limits on independent expenditures as potentially
corrupting members of Congress. Recently, the United States Department of Justice indicted
Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) on corruption charges. The charges stem from Senator
Menendez’s relationship with a Florida ophthalmologist who donated $600,000 to a Democratic
super PAC from his business, earmarking it to “be spent in New Jersey helping on the senator’s
re-election.” In exchange, Menendez allegedly “intervene[d] in a Medicare billing dispute worth
almost $9 million” to his donor, among other alleged favors (Confessore and Apuzzo). Under the
Citizens United decision, it would seem that neither Menendez’s donor nor Menendez did
anything illegal. However, the situation manifestly appears corrupt. This situation is a perfect
example of how the residual effects of Citizens United can influence Congress. On one hand, the
effects have the ability to further divide Congress, pushing candidates further to the extremes. On
the other hand, they can clearly create the appearance of corruption in the Congressional election
system in both chambers of Congress.
The Supreme Court has created a significant problem in the wake of its Citizens United
decision. Justice Kennedy may have been correct when he stated that unlimited independent
expenditures “did not give rise to corruption.” However, he may have been incorrect in asserting
that lifting the limits and restrictions on independent expenditures, equating money with speech,
and enfranchising corporations with First Amendment free speech rights did not give rise to the
“appearance of corruption” (Citizens United v. FEC [558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876]). Citizens
United significantly affected how the House of Representatives operated by contributing to the
significant increase in partisanship following its deciding. Many, myself included, have viewed
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this decision as influencing Congress to the point where Congress does appear to be corrupted
and swayed by the amount of independent expenditure money spent in election cycles. While
lifting the limits and restrictions on independent expenditures may only give rise to the
“appearance of corruption,” the Supreme Court recognizes that avoiding the appearance of
corruption is a compelling enough reason to impose restrictions on free speech (idem.). I have
shown through my research that the lifting of independent expenditure limits and restrictions can
have a powerful effect on the partisan tendencies of those who depend on maximizing financing
to keep their jobs. Clearly, the Citizens United decision can have other residual effects that,
though unintentional, serve to undermine the faith people have in the democratic electoral system
that the US maintains. Though the Supreme Court may have never intended the Citizens United
decision to give rise to this, the fact of the matter is that many US citizens now view the
aftereffects of the decision as corruptive of the US political system. Perhaps the Court needs to
revisit this issue in the near future, and sooner rather than later.
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